University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 17
Number 3 Spring, 1987

Article 18

1987

American Banker's Ass'n v. SEC: SEC Has No
Authority to Regulate Banks Dealing with the
Purchase and Sale of Securities
Cynthia A. Houghten

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Houghten, Cynthia A. (1987) "American Banker's Ass'n v. SEC: SEC Has No Authority to Regulate Banks Dealing with the Purchase
and Sale of Securities," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 17 : No. 3 , Article 18.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol17/iss3/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

American Banker's
Ass'n v. SEC: SEC
Has No Authority to
Regulate Banks Dealing
with the Purchase and
Sale of Securities
by Cynthia A. Houghten

ecently, inAmen·can Banker'sAss'n
v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir.
1986}, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit held that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has no authority to
regulate the transactions that banks make
in dealing with the purchase and sale of
securities and invalidated a rule issued by
the SEC that had attempted to regulate
such banks in the same manner as it does
securities brokers or dealers. In so holding
the court reinforced the clear intent of
Congress that the regulation of banks was
not among the powers delegated to the SEC
in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
( 1934 Act). 15 U .S.C. § 78a.
In 1985, the SEC adopted Rule 3b-9 following a notice and comment rulemaking
procedure. That rule required banks which
engaged in the securities brokerage business for profit to register with the SEC as
broker-dealers pursuant to the 1934 Act.
The American Bankers Association (ABA)
filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that Rule 3b-9 was invalid under the 1934 Act, and an injunction
prohibiting the SEC from enforcing the
rule against ABA banks. On cross-motions
for summary judgment, the court ruled for
the SEC and dismissed the case. An appeal
to the court of appeals was taken by the
ABA.
The controversy in the present case is
the result of fifty years of evolving banking
and securities regulations. In order to understand the present conflict, a brief history of the earlier legislation concerning
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the subject is helpful. Section 16 of the
Banking Act of 1933, also known as the
Glass-Steagall Act, limited securities dealings by banks to purchasing and selling
stocks without recourse for existing customers and subjected the purchase of stocks
for the bank's own account to certain restrictions mandated by the Comptroller of
the Currency. In pertinent part§ 16 states:
The business of dealing in securities
and stock by the [national bank] shall
be limited to purchasing and selling
such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for
the account of customers, and in no
case for its own account, and the [national bank] shall not underwrite any
issue of securities or stock: Provided:
That the [national bank] may purchase
for its own account investment securities under such limitations and restriction as the Comptroller of the Currency
may be regulation prescribe.
12 u.s.c. § 24.
Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act established a clear line between investment and
commercial banking activities, and prohibited the coexistence of the two in any
one organization. That section provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful ... for any person, firm, corporation, association,
business trust, or similar organization,
engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at
wholesale or retail, or though syndicate
participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to

engage at the same time to any extent
whatever in the business of receiving
deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook,
certificate of deposit, or other evidence
of debt, or upon request of the depositor: Provided, that the provisions of
this paragraph shall not prohibit national banks or State banks or trust
companies (whether or not members
of the Federal Reserve System) or other
financial institutions or private bankers from dealing in, underwriting,
purchasing and selling investment
securities, or issuing securities, to the
extent permitted to national banking
associations by the provisions of section 24 of this title ....
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1).
The Comptroller of the Currency interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act in 1936 as
limiting the activities of national banks to
brokerage transactions for existing customers of the bank. Banks so dealing were
prohibited from retaining any commissions
from stock transactions unless the fee did
not exceed the cost of the transaction.
Therefore, under the Glass-Steagall Act, a
bank could engage in the securities business only as "an accommodation agent for
the convenience of its existing customers
and not for profit." 1 Bulletin of the Comptroller of the Currency paragraph 35 (October 26, 1936).
Since its enactment in 1933, the Comptroller's interpretation of the Glass-Steagall
Act has changed several times, each time
becoming progressively more liberal. The

first change came in 1957, when an opinion
of the Comptroller ofthe Currencyreversed
the prohibition against national banks receiving profits from brokerage transactions
performed for the convenience of their
customers. See Digest of Opinions of the
Comptroller of the Currency paragraph
220A (August 1957 Edition) (quoted in
[1973-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) paragraph 96,272 at
81,357). Nevertheless, a bank's brokerage
activities were still limited to an accommodation service for their existing customers whose relationship with the bank
existed "independently of the particular
securities transaction." !d. The next change
came in 1974 when the Comptroller allowed banks to "offer and advertise
computer-assisted stock purchasing services." American Banker's Ass'n, 804 F.2d
at 741. This service was still limited to
customers with checking accounts at the
particular bank. Finally, the interpretation of the Act came full swing when the
Comptroller of the Currency permitted
national banks to establish subsidiaries to
offer retail discount brokerage services,
even to non-customers, at branch offices of
the banks. See In re Security Pacific Nat'/
Bank (August 26, 1982) (reprinted in
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) paragraph 99,824 at
86,255). The ruling in In re Security Pacific
Nat'/ Bank was subsequently extended to
allow the bank, itself, to offer brokerage
services in addition to those of a subsidiary.
See, e.g., Comptroller of the Currency
Opinion Letter No. 363 (May 23, 1986);
see also 50 Fed. Reg. 31,605 (August 5,
1985) (withdrawing proposed rule requiring the use of a subsidiary to engage in discount brokerage services). In support, the
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, which
have the power to interpret the GlassSteagall Act, have concurred with this
most recent decision of the Comptroller of
the Currency.
Prior to the 1980's, the SEC did not
attempt to regulate the activities of banks
dealing in securities. In recent years,
however, numerous banks entered into the
discount brokerage service as a result of
the changed interpretation of the GlassSteagall Act. This prompted the SEC to
promulgate Rule 3b-9 to subject banks to
the same regulations as non-bank brokers.
The new rule regulated a bank that either
"publicly solicits brokerage business for
which it receives transaction-related compensation" or "receives transaction-related
compensation for providing brokerage services for trust, managing agency or other
accounts to which the bank provides advice." 17 C.F.R. § 240-3b-9(a)(l)-(2)

(1986). A "transaction-related compensation" is defined in the rule as the "mean
monetary profit to the bank in excess of
cost recovery for providing brokerage execution services." 17 C.F.R. § 240-3b-9(d).
Thus the rule seeks to regulate all banks
which make a profit on securities transactions. The SEC subjected banks dealing in
securities to the new rule under the theory
that government regulation should be divided among the various agencies "according to the different financial functions performed by the regulated entity, and not
according to the species of [the] financial
institution." American Banker's Ass'n, 804
F.2d at 742.
However, according to the court, the
SEC's theory contradicted the express intent of Congress. In order to promulgate
the rule, the ~EC coined definitions ofkey

"It was the clear
intent of Congress
that the regulation
of banks was not
among the powers
delegated to the SEC
in the Securities
and Exchange Act
of 1934."

terms that conflicted with the definitions
for the same words in the 1934 Act. The
1934 Act defines the word "broker" to
mean "any person engaging in the business
of effecting transactions in securities for
the account of others, but does not include a
bank." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4). Similarly,
the term "dealer" is defined in the Act as
"any person engaged in the business of
buying or selling securities for his own
account ... but does not include a bank."
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (emphasis added).
Each definition clearly exempted a bank
from the meaning of the words ''broker" or
"dealer." The definition of a "bank" under
the Act was tied to the entities that regulate
the banking industry. A bank was "essentially ... an institution subject to at least
one of several existing banking regulators:
the federal Comptroller of the Currency
(for all nationally chartered banks), the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System (for a member bank), or any other
state or Federal authority having supervision over banks." 804 F.2d at 744. However, in Rule 3b-9, the SEC reinserts into
the definitions of broker and dealer any
bank that: "(1) Publicly solicits brokerage
business for which it receives transactionrelated compensation ... ;"or "(2) Directly
or indirectly receives transaction-related
compensation for providing brokerage services for trust, managing agency, or other
accounts to which the bank provides advice." 17 C.F.R. § 240-3b-9(a)(1}{2) 1986).
By so doing, the SEC attempted to regulate an area over which it previously had
no jurisdiction.
In striking down the rule, the court relied on and provided a detailed account of
the legislative history behind the 1934 Act.
The purpose of the 1934 Act was to subject the previously unregulated securities
market to government control similar to
that already imposed on banks by the GlassSteagall Act. While Congress created a
new agency, the SEC, to supervise investment banking, it clearly excluded banks
from further regulation. See H. Rep. No
1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 17. Exclusion
of the banks from the SEC's jurisdiction
also protected against over-regulation of
banks by "two arms of the Government
whose purposes and policies might at times
conflict." Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, Part 15, 73rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 7222 (1934). In later legislation concerning investment banking, Congress
was consistent in its definition of banks according to the agencies which regulated
them and excluded commercial banks
from regulation by the SEC. See Investment Company and Investment Advisers
Acts, 54 Stat. 791 ( 1940).
The SEC argued that Congress exempted
banks from regulation in the 1934 Act
since Congress believed that the GlassSteagall Act of 1933 prohibited banks
from brokering securities for non-banking
customers or for profit. The SEC relied on
the testimony before Congress of Mr.
Thomas Corcoran, one of the drafters of
the Act, and then counsel to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to prove
that such was Congress' interpretation of
the 1934 Act. Corcoran testified that
under the Glass-Steagall bill a bank
can no longer peddle securities at retail. It can do two things: it can buy
securities for its own account, for its
own investment; and it can act as agent
to transmit to a broker an order to purchase or sell securities, given to it by
one of the bank's customers.
See Senate Hearings, supra at 6470.
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Thus, the SEC contended that under the
Glass-Steagall Act, banks were either precluded from engaging in specified brokerage activities or that if the Glass-Steagall
Act did not so prohibit, that the SEC
should be able to regulate the new retail
brokerage activities of banks.
The court disagreed with that argument
and assumed that the testimony of Corcoran was an incorrect interpretation of
the Glass-Steagall Act. Further, the court
noted that Congress expressly intended to
exempt banks from the regulation by the
SEC of broker-dealers since banks were
already heavily regulated by other state
and federal agencies. Finally, the court
refused to believe that in enacting the 1934
Act, Congress had done so based on their
misinterpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act,
and would not have exempted banks from
the SEC's jurisdiction had it known how
the Glass-Steagall Act would later be interpreted.
The court lent further weight to the idea
that Congress intended to exclude banks
from the SEC's regulatory power by pointing out that more recent legislation reaffirmed the separation of regulatory powers
over investment and commercial banks. In
1975, while aware of the changed interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act, which by
then had dropped the accommodation
concept, Congress declined to redefine the
terms broker or dealer to include banks. It
did, however, authorize the SEC to conduct a study into the emergence of banks
into the retail brokerage industry. Act of
June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat.
111. Further, after the 1957 and 1974
changes in the interpretation of the GlassSteagall Act, the SEC did not rush in to
regulate banks.
The SEC's next argument was based on
the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v.
Variable Annuity L1je Ins. Co. of America,
359 U.S. 65 (1965) (VAL/C), which upheld the SEC's regulation of a particular
type of annuity contract although insurance contracts were clearly excepted from
regulation in the Investment Act of 1940.
Since a variable rate annuity contract differed from a traditional insurance contract
in that annuitants under the former were
paid a return based on the insurance company's investment of the premium, it was
considered to be an equity share. Further,
the laws excepted from SEC regulation a
company engaged primarily in the traditional business of insurance. A company
selling only the variable rate annuity contract could not meet such a requirement.
The SEC argued that a bank selling securities was in essence comparable to the defendant in VALIC, and thus could not be
defined as merely a bank. Therefore, the
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SEC should have jurisdiction to regulate
an institution that sells securities. However, the court pointed out that banks of
the ABA, even if dealing in securities, still
qualified as banks as defined in 15 U .S.C.
§ 78c (a)(6). The court also noted that the
ruling in VALIC was due to the finding of
impercise terms in the applicable statutes.
It could not so find in this case where the
statutory definitions were clear and unambiguous.
Rather than VALIC, the court stated that
the instant case was controlled by the decision in Board of Governors v. Dimension
Fin. Corp., __ U.S. __ (1986), where
the Supreme Court struck down the Board
of Governors' attempt to regulate as banks
certain institutions offering negotiable
order of withdraw (NOW) accounts. In so
doing, the Court reiterated the fact that
only institutions so regulated according to
Congress' definition could be considered
as banks. Merely offering services which
are the functional equivalent of those offered by a regulated bank could not bring
such a financial institution under the
powers of the bank regulators. While a
definition relying on the identity of the
regulator rather than, as the SEC contended, the nature of the services offered
may be imperfect, the Court noted that
only Congress had the power to change the
statutory definitions.
The court further rejected the SEC's attempt to show that precatory language in
the definitions of the statutes allowed the
court to defer to the agencies interpretation of those definitions. The SEC interpreted the phrase "unless the context
otherwise requires" as referring to terms
not included in the 1934 Act. The court,
however, pointed to the legislative history
which indicated that the precatory phrase
was only intended to apply to any inconsistencies within the 1934 Act itself and
did not confer such power on the SEC.
Further, the SEC's power under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(b), to define terms of the trade and
technical words could not give rise to a definition coined by the SEC that would have
given it additional power over an area
previously excluded from its jurisdiction.
With the court's ruling in this case, the
division in the regulatory responsibility
over commercial and investment banking
has been clearly delineated. The SEC's attempt at manipulating statutory semantics
was summarily rejected. Unless and until
Congress changes the definitions ofbanks,
brokers and dealers in the Securities and
Exchange Act or until such changes are effectuated, the SEC will not be able to regulate the transactions of banks as brokers or
dealers in the securities market.
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